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NOTES
DEATH BENEFITS FOR A CONCUBINE UNDER LOuIsIANA'S
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
Plaintiff, the concubine of the deceased, sued to recover
death benefits' under Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation
Law.' At the time of death, plaintiff, though unmarried, had
lived with the deceased as his wife for eleven years in a stable
home relationship. None of the usual class of claimants were
involved, the decedent having no legal spouse, no children, and
no surviving dependent parent or sibling. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal3 of the plain-
tiff's claim and held that under these circumstances the depen-
dent concubine of a workman could recover death benefits for
1. LA. R.S. 23:1231-36 (Supp. 1975) comprise the death benefits provisions of
Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation Law. Plaintiff initially sought recovery under
LA. R.S. 23:1232 (1950) as the "widow" of the deceased and, alternatively, as an "other
dependent." Recovery as a "widow," which is a preferred classification, was rejected
by the lower court and not considered by the Louisiana Supreme Court. LA. R.S.
23:1232 (1950) provides in part:
Payment to dependents shall be computed and divided among them on the
following basis: (1) If the widow or widower alone, thirty-two and one-half per
centum of wages . . . . (8) If there are neither widow, widower, nor child, nor
dependent parent entitled to compensation, then to one brother or sister, thirty-
two and one-half per centum of wages with eleven per centum additional for
each brother or sister in excess of one., If other dependents than those enumer-
ated, thirty-two and one-half per centum of wages for one, and eleven per cen-
tum additional for each such dependent in excess of one, subject to a maximum
of sixty-five per centum of wages for all, regardless of the number of dependents.
Members of a preferred class must receive their statutory share before deferred claim-
ants can recover. Should the preferred classes exhaust the maximum amount payable
under the statute, then the deferred claimants receive nothing. Caddo Contracting
Co. v. Johnson, 222 La. 796, 64 So. 2d 177 (1953). See Ruffin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 312
So. 2d 878 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975). See also Brown v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 250 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971). The maximum amount payable is a flat
rate as set by LA. R.S. 23:1202 (Supp. 1975).
2. Louisiana's workmen's compensation law is variously denominated as the
Employers' Liability Act, the Burke-Roberts Employers' Liability Act, or Louisiana's
Workmen's Compensation Law. 1914 La. Acts, No. 20; LA. R.S. 23:1021 (Supp. 1975).
3. Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 346 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), rev'd,
354 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1978).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
his work-related death as a dependent member of his family.,
Henderson v. Travelers Insurance Co., 354 So. 2d 1031 (La.
1978).
Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation Law was enacted in
1914 to replace the existing, inadequate scheme of tort liabil-
ity' and to shift the economic burden of industrial hazards to
industry as a cost of production.7 The purpose of the death
benefits provisions, in particular, has been to compensate those
dependent claimants who are deprived of their means of finan-
cial support. s The provisions have remained substantially unal-
tered up to the present time?
The courts, in applying the death benefits provisions, have
not always been mindful of their purpose. The earliest cases
arising under these provisions involved claimants who were
blood relatives of a deceased workman. In Haag v. E.Z. Can
Opener Bag Co.,"° the Orleans Court of Appeal dealt for the
first time with the availability of death benefits to an "other
dependent."" Looking to the statute's use of "family"' 2 and to
4. See LA. R.S. 23:1232(8) (1950), supra note 1. See also note 11, infra.
5. 1914 La. Acts, No. 20. For an authoritative discussion of Louisiana's work-
men's compensation law, past, present, and future, see W. MALONE, LOUISIANA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1951).
6. The courts had developed the employers' defenses such as contributory negli-
gence, the fellow-servant rule, and assumption of risk; and these defenses, along with
the inherent increasing hazards in developing industry, often worked harshly against
the employee and his tort action. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE
OF LOUISIANA, 2d Reg. Sess. at 34-35 (1914).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., McDermott v. Funel, 258 La. 657, 247 So. 2d 567 (1971); Flanagan
v. A L & W Moore Trucking Contractors, 100 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
9. Though the provisions have been frequently amended, the changes have cen-
tered primarily on the listed disabilities and the allowable compensation. See 1916 La.
Acts, No. 243; 1918 La. Acts, Nos. 38, 39; 1920 La. Acts, Nos. 234, 244, 247; 1922 La.
Acts, No. 43; 1924 La. Acts, Nos. 21, 216; 1926 La. Acts, No. 85; 1928 La. Acts, No.
242; 1930 La. Acts, No. 81; 1934 La, Acts, No. 29; 1938 La. Acts, No. 232; 1942 La.
Acts, No. 96; 1944 La. Acts, Nos. 120, 143; 1946 La. Acts, No. 371; 1948 La. Acts, Nos.
175, 179; 1950 La. Acts, No. 539; 1968 Ex. Sess. La. Acts, No. 25; 1970 La. Acts, No.
412; 1975 La. Acts, No. 583. The greatest changes in the death benefits provisions
occurred between 1916 and 1926.
10. 2 Pelt. 598 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1919).
11. To recover as an "other dependent" under LA. R.S. 23:1232(8) (1950), a
claimant must fit within the definition of "dependent" in LA. R.S. 23:1253 (1950). The
latter provision provides in part: "No person shall be considered a dependent, unless
he is a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bearing to him the relation
of husband or widow, or lineal descendant or ascendant, or brother, or sister, or child."
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Massachusetts cases 3 interpreting similar provisions, the court
denied recovery to the niece and nephew of the deceased. Al-
though the claimants were dependent on the deceased, the
court found that they did not reside with him and were not
subject to his authority. In a later case," the sister, niece, and
grandnephew were allowed compensation based on a finding
that they were dependent on the deceased and had lived in the
same household with him. These two factors-dependency and
residency-have since become determinative in deciding
whether a person may recover as an "other dependent."' 5
In Archibald v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. ,' the
Louisiana Supreme Court faced the new question of whether
claimants unrelated by blood to a deceased workman could
recover death benefits. A dependent father-in-law, mother-in-
law, and two sisters-in-law resided with the deceased, thereby
meeting the second criterion which, in the past, had entitled
dependent blood relatives to recover. The court, reasoning that
the Act should be liberally construed with a view towards
carrying out its purpose," held that all claimants were entitled
to compensation. The court has used the same reasoning in
awarding benefits to the unacknowledged illegitimate child of
This provision has remained substantially unaltered since the original Act 20 of 1914.
See the acts cited at note 9, supra. The courts have interpreted the word "or" in this
provision to be disjunctive and hence the word "family" to include persons other than
those relations specifically listed in the provision. Accord, Caddo Contracting Co. v.
Johnson, 222 La. 796, 64 So. 2d 177 (1953). See Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg.
Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So. 2d 842 (1945), discussed in text at notes 16 and 18, infra,
respectively; Archibald v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 202 La. 89, 11 So. 2d
492 (1942). See also Turner v. Consolidated Underwriters, 170 So. 2d 199 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1964), which gives a different twist to the meaning of "family."
12. LA. R.S. 23:1232(8), 23:1253 (1950). See note 11, supra.
13. The court looked to the similar provisions of Massachusetts' Employers'
Liability Act and the following cases interpreting them: In re Murphy, 228 Mass. 555,
117 N.E. 794 (1917); In re Cowden, 225 Mass. 66, 113 N.E. 1036 (1916); In re Murphy,
224 Mass. 592, 113 N.E. 283 (1916); In re Kelly, 222 Mass. 538, 111 N.E. 395 (1916).
14. Joseph v. Board of Comm'rs, 5 La. App. 678 (Orl. 1927). But see Grant v.
Louisiana Sawmill Co., Inc., 6 La. App. 673 (2d Cir. 1927), where the dependent
grandmother of the deceased was held entitled to benefits even though she didn't reside
with him. The court construed "family" as encompassing a dependent blood relative
not residing with the deceased employee.
15. Patin v. T. L. James & Co., 218 La. 949, 51 So. 2d 586 (1951); Turner v.
Consolidated Underwriters, 170 So. 2d 199 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
16. 202 La. 89, 11 So. 2d 492 (1942).
17. Id. at 94, 11 So. 2d at 493. See text at notes 7-8, supra.
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a deceased'8 and to the nephew of a deceased's concubine',
when the dependency and residency criteria were met.
The concubine, as a claimant, has fared less well under the
jurisprudence. In the leading case of Moore v. Capitol Glass
Co.,2" the First Circuit Court of Appeal was confronted with a
claimant who had lived with a workman for six years prior to
his death and who was dependent upon him for support. Al-
though they had not been married, the two had lived together
as husband and wife and were so regarded by neighbors and
friends. However, in spite of this compliance with the depend-
ency and residency requirements, the court denied compensa-
tion. The cases granting recovery to illegitimate children were
distinguished on the grounds that the illegitimate children
were not responsible for their status and that their parents had
an obligation to support them under the Louisiana Civil Code.2'
Under similar circumstances, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Humphreys v. Marquette Casualty Co.2" relied heavily on
Moore and denied recovery to a concubine, stating that it was
not within the "contemplation of the legislature" to allow her
death benefits.3
18. Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So. 2d 842 (1945).
This decision cast doubt on a small line of cases which had denied benefits to unac-
knowledged illegitimate children of deceased employees. See Beard v. Rickert Rice
Mills, Inc., 185 La. 55, 168 So. 492 (1936); Gullung v. Dalgarn Const. Co., 1 La. App.
147 (Orl. Cir. 1924). See also Gros v. Millers' Indem. Underwriters, 153 La. 257, 95 So.
709 (1923), where the same issue was presented but not ruled upon. Illegitimate chil-
dren acknowledged under the provisions of LA. Civ. CODE arts. 203, 204, and 205 are
each entitled to recover as a "child" by the express terms-of the Act. LA. R.S.
23:1021(3), 23:1232.(1950).
19. Patin v. T. L. James & Co., 218 La. 949, 51 So. 2d 586 (1951).
20. 25 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946).
21. Id. at 250. The court in Moore relied, in part, upon Schurler v. Industrial
Comm'n, 86 Utah 284, 43 P.2d 696 (1935). It is interesting to note that the court in
Schurler based denial on grounds unrelated to these distinctions,' being more con-
cerned with the possibility of persons "building up" recovery situations out of an illicit
relationship. Consequently, Louisiana's jurisprudence, following Moore's path, has
focused on these distinctions which were relatively unimportant in Schurler. These
distinctions seem to have provided fertile soil for the growth of the concept of "'moral
unworthiness"-a stigma attached to concubines to preclude their recovery under the
Act.
22. ' 235 La. 355, 103 So. 2d 895 (1958).
23. Also cited in Humphreys were Simpson v. Norman, 51 La. Ann. 1355, 26 So.
266 (1899), and Sparrow v. Sparrow, 231 La. 966, 93 So. 2d 232 (1957). These cases
denied rights to a concubine in contractual and partnership settings, respectively, and
were cited in Humphreys for the general proposition that the law will not
NOTES
In the instant case the appellate court believed that the
concubine was entitled to death benefits based on its "best
interpretation" of Revised Statutes 23:1232(8) and on the rea-
soning supporting Archibald and Thompson v. Vestal Lumber
& Mfg. Co.,24 but felt constrained to dismiss her claim because
of the supreme court's decision in Humphreys."5 However, the
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, overruled
Humphreys, and granted recovery to the concubine. In reach-
ing this decision, the court relied on the jurisprudence which
had allowed compensation to "dependent members of the fam-
ily" in the absence of blood ties" and the fact that "the work-
men's compensation act was designed to protect all dependent
members of the family household from the loss of support
caused by a wage-earner's death through work-accident."'
Emphasizing these two factors, the court reasoned that the use
of "moral unworthiness" to distinguish concubines from other
unrelated dependents was unsound. The court could find no
legislative intent in the terms of the act itself to exclude a
claimant for moral unworthiness; nor could it discern any gen-
eral legislative policy indicating a desire to punish concubines
through a general deprivation of rights and benefits. Therefore,
the court felt that it had "erred in Humphreys in importing
moral unworthiness as a criterion for eligibility for compensa-
tion benefits .... "28
Underlying this decision is an express repudiation of moral
unworthiness as a factor to be used in determining recovery
under the act and a reaffirmation that dependency on a work-
man and residency in his family household are the only rele-
vant criteria for recovery. However, it is important to note the
court's emphasis on the definition of a "concubine." To be a
"concubine," a woman must have lived with a man in an
arrangement resembling that of husband and wife.29 Conse-
"countenance" illicit relationships. See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Caesar, 345 So.
2d 64 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), for a more recent case where death benefits were denied
to the concubine.
24. 208 La. 83, 22 So. 2d 842 (1945).
25. Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 346 So. 2d 816, 818-19 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977), rev'd, 354 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1978).
26. 354 So. 2d at 1032, 1033.
27. Id. at 1034.
28. d.
29. Id. at 1033. The court continued, "As we stated in Gauff v. Johnson, 161 La.
19781
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quently, the court placed much emphasis on the duration and
stability of the plaintiff's and decedent's living arrangement.
Also stressed were the facts that no other claimants were in-
volved and that any such claimants, if present, would have
recovered in a preferred category. 0 The implications of this
decision may be limited by this restrictive definition of a con-
cubine.
Justice Summers, in his dissent, noted that allowing re-
covery to the concubine was contrary to the general rule exist-
ing throughout the United States.3' Although this statement is
true, it is misleading. The court was construing the Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation Law, and the variations in the com-
pensation schemes of the other states minimize the relevance
of any general rule. Additionally, the existence of numerous
exceptions to such a rule further minimize its importance. 2
The decision in Henderson was not completely un-
expected; recent cases having forecasted such a result. In
Dickerson v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co.,"3 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal indicated that it felt
"constrained to follow" Humphreys because it had been de-
cided by the supreme court." Certiorari was later denied, but
only over the dissent of three justices who felt that Humphreys
should be overruled.35 Indeed, most of the cases in this area
have illustrated a gradual broadening of recovery under the
act.3
975, 977, 109 So. 782, 783 (1926): '... the concubine must not be confounded with
the courtesan, or even what is ordinarily called a mistress. She is a wife without title.'"
Id. See Succession of Franz, 232 La. 310, 94 So. 2d 270 (1957) ("concubinage" describes
a status and not simply acts of fornication or adultery, even if frequent, and implies
maintaining a status which resembles marriage); Succession of Jahraus, 114 La. 456,
38 So. 417 (1905) (concubinage continues today to describe a status resembling legal
marriage); Note, 32 TUL. L. REV. 127 (1957) (a concubine is not a "mistress" -or
"courtesan" because she assumes the duties, responsibilities, and position of a legal
wife).
30. 354 So, 2d at 1032.
31. Id. at 1035 (Summers, J., dissenting).
32. For instance, where common law marriages are accepted, the common law
wife can recover. Furthermore, in so far as common law wives resemble concubines,
the general rule and its exceptions actually support the present decision. For discussion
of other exceptions, see generally 81 AM. JUR. 2d Workmen's Compensation §§ 198-
200.
33. 248 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
34. Id. at 854,
35. 252 So. 2d 457 (La. 1971).
36. See text at notes 10 through 19, supra.
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Despite the trend of increased recovery under the act, fu-
ture application of this decision may be restricted. Although
the court granted recovery to a concubine, it did so in a narrow
holding. The holding was limited by the emphasis on the par-
ticular facts37 and by the definition of a "concubine."18 Lower
courts may find little guidance in the instant decision in a
factual setting where both the surviving spouse of the deceased
and his concubine claim workmen's compensation benefits."9
Indeed the Louisiana Supreme Court may find that this deci-
sion has created some practical problems, because if a concu-
bine is allowed to recover in such a situation, the court will
have to make an unfortunate choice. One choice would be to
allow equal recovery to the widow and the concubine, but this
would distort section 1232 in its present form.40 A second choice
would be to follow the instant case and allow the concubine to
recover as a member of the deferred class of "other depen-
dents." Such a decision would be analogous to that in Stokes
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.," in which an unacknowledged
illegitimate child was precluded from recovering benefits be-
cause the other legitimate children, who were in a preferred
class, had absorbed the maximum amount payable under the
act. However, the United States Supreme Court reversed
37. The court placed great emphasis on the following facts: (1) the deceased and
his concubine had lived together for eleven years; (2) they had lived in a stable and
loving relationship; (3) the deceased was not married, had no children, and was sur-
vived by no dependent parents or siblings, so his concubine was the only person
asserting any right to death benefits. 354 So. 2d at 1032.
38. See note 29, supra, and accompanying text.
39. The situation where an employee would be survived by his legal spouse as
well as his concubine is not unheard of. See Caddo Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 222
La. 796, 64 So. 2d 177 (1953) (where the deceased had maintained two households-one
consisting of his legal wife and the other of his concubine and illegitimate children).
40. LA. R.S. 23:1232 (1950) does not contemplate such an award of benefits. It
provides that "payment to dependents shall be computed and divided among them
on the following basis: (1) If the widow or widower alone .. . (2) If the widow or
widower . . . .(3) If the widow or widower .... " "Widow" and "widower," as used
in this provision, refer to only one person.
A similar problem could arise with LA. R.S. 23:1233 (Supp. 1975), which provides
that "in the case of remarriage of a surviving spouse, two years compensation pay-
ments shall be payable in one lump sum." As things stand now, it would seem that
the reference to a "surviving spouse" and "remarriage" precludes payment to a concu-
bine. However, should concubines be held to recover equally with surviving spouses, a
situation will arise with which this provision was not designed to cope.
41. 257 La. 424, 242 So. 2d 567 (1970).
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Stokes and held that this distinction between legitimate and
unacknowledged illegitimate children violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the United States Constitution.2 To allow
compensation to a legal spouse in preference to a concubine
could possibly invite a similar constitutional attack. '"
A situation more likely to arise would be the claim of a
concubine coupled with the claims of one or more preferred
claimants other than a surviving wife." To award recovery to
a concubine as a deferred claimant in this situation would like-
wise be differential treatment based on marital status. Further,
this situation may be more fragile constitutionally because the
threat to the state's interest in promoting the legitimate family
unit seems to be less weighty. The wife has traditionally been
viewed as central to the legitimate family unit, and the concu-
42. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
43. The outcome would depend largely on whether the level of scrutiny to be used
in examining marital status classifications would be similar to that used in examining
illegitimate-legitimate children classifications. In dealing with the latter, the United
States Supreme Court has stopped short of a strict scrutiny analysis. However, it has
not applied minimal scrutiny, preferring a middle ground. See Note, 38 LA. L. REV.
189 (1977), and Note, 32 ARK. L. REV. 120 (1978), both discussing Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977). As to statutory classifications based on marital status, the Court
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), likewise applied a level of scrutiny less
than strict yet more than minimal. See Glucksman and Mitchelson, Equal Protection
for Unmarried Cohabiters: An Insider's Look at Marvin v. Marvin, 5 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 283 (1978).
It can be said that the Court might more closely examine statutory classifications
based on the legitimacy of children. Illegitimate children are not responsible for their
status, and therefore such a classification would not reasonably further Louisiana's
rational interest in promoting the legitimate family. The concubine, on the other hand,
is responsible for her status.
However, it is to be noted that deferred recovery does not seem to reasonably
further Louisiana's interest as to the concubine. Although the concubine is somewhat
"responsible" for her status, allowing her to recover only as a deferred claimant is not
a reasonable way to deter her from such cohabitation. This reasoning was precisely that
which prompted the Court in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972), to hold unconstitutional the distinction between legitimate and unacknow-
ledged illegitimate children. On the other hand, allowing a concubine to recover
equally with the lawful wife, as an expression of legislative policy, might have the
opposite effect of encouraging cohabitation. These considerations may have been what
prompted the court in Henderson to say: "The legislative policy . . . of disfavoring
concubines in favor of the legitimate family . . . is adequately served by the concu-
bine's less favored position with regard to the preferred compensation claimants
." Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 1031, 1034 n.6 (La. 1978).
44. E.g., dependent parents, brothers, sisters, or children of the deceased work-
man.
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bine is definitely an intruder when she competes with the wife.
However, when the concubine is competing with a child for
compensation she presents less of a threat to the state interest
in promoting the legitimate family. Concubinage inherently
threatens a marriage; but when there is no legal wife, a concu-
bine and a child have the potential to function as a family unit.
When the concubine competes with a parent or sibling of the
deceased workman the state has even less reason to discrimi-
nate against her because the latter claimants are not consid-
ered members of the workman's family unit.
A final question to be considered is whether this decision
portends a similar result in the area of wrongful death actions.45
The first class of beneficiaries in a wrongful death action in-
cludes "the surviving spouse" and any children. Cases dealing
with this class, and the statute in general, have indicated that
the basis of the remedy is the blood or marriage tie."6 The
difference between this basis and that of workmen's compensa-
tion-which is the economic dependency of the claim-
ant 4"-would seem to minimize the relevance of the instant
decision to a wrongful death action by a concubine." However,
in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co." the Court noted the
45. Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides in pertinent part that
[tIhe right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi offense,
if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death
of the deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the
deceased, or either such spouse or child or such children; (2) the surviving father
and mother of .the deceased, or either of them, if he left no spouse or child
surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of
them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving. The survivors in whose
favor this right of action survives may also recover the damages which they
sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased.
46. See, e.g., Harris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 48 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1950) (the spouse, though judicially separated from the victim, was entitled to
bring the wrongful death action); Brock v. Friend, 4 La. App. 723 (1st Cir. 1925)
(widow, though remarried at the time, was allowed to maintain her action). For a
thorough discussion of LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315, see Johnson, Death on the Callais
Coach: The Mystery of Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 LA. L. REv.
1 (1976).
47. See text at note 8, supra. See also Flanagan v. A L & W Moore Trucking
Contractors, 100 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958), which is also in clear contrast to
the cases cited in note 46, supra.
48. See generally Board of Comm'rs v. Public Belt R. Comm'n, 58 So. 2d 306 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1952), where the court discussed the "antagonistic philosophies" behind
these two areas of the law.
49. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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similarities between article 2315 and Louisiana's Workmen's
Compensation Act ° and felt that Levy v. Louisiana,5 a wrong-
ful death case, was binding.52 Should there arise a United
States Supreme Court decision mandating equal treatment of
a surviving spouse and a concubine under the workmen's com-
pensation law, such a decision might be binding in a subse-
quent constitutional attack on the wrongful death provisions.
The decision in Henderson is palatable, particularly as a
recognition of the impropriety of using "moral unworthiness"
as a factor in awarding workmen's compensation benefits. By
removing the moral judgment, this decision realizes the true
purpose of a compensation scheme in an industrial so-
ciety-compensation for dependents. However, as discussed
earlier," several problems lie ahead. It is submitted that the
problems of a constitutional dimension could be eliminated by
amending the death benefits provisions. By substituting one
term such as "consort" for "spouse," "widow," and "widower,"
and by ascribing to "consort" a definition requiring living to-
gether in a permanent relationship, the courts could address
each situation with needed flexibility and an awareness of the
purpose behind the act, while adhering to the spirit of the
present case."
William Mark Claudel
A CAUTIOUS STEP FORWARD
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding alleging commission
of first degree murder by a juvenile, the juvenile court denied
pretrial motions requesting a public trial, a trial by jury, and
50. The Court noted that both the wrongful death provisions and the workmen's
compensation law were "state-created compensation schemes" benefiting close rela-
tives and dependents of the deceased and that both were "outgrowths and modifica-
tions of our basic tort law, designed to soften the often harsh common-law rules."
406 U.S. at 171-72.
51. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
52. 406 U.S. at 168-72.
53. See text at notes 36-52, supra.
54. Although such an amendment could possibly have the effect of sanctioning
concubinage, the simplicity and ease of administration which would result strongly
militate in favor of it.
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